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ABSTRACT
Background: The objective of the study was to model urban evacuation into surrounding communities after the
detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) to assist rural and suburban planners in understanding and
effectively planning to address the effects of population surges.
Methods: Researchers developed parameters for how far evacuees would travel to escape disasters and factors
that would influence choice of destination from studies of historical evacuations, surveys of citizens’ evacu-
ation intentions in hypothetical disasters, and semistructured interviews with key informants and emergency
preparedness experts. Those parameters became the inputs to a “push-pull” model of howmany people would
flee in the 4 scenarios and where they would go.
Results: The expanded model predicted significant population movements from the New York City borough of
Manhattan and counties within 20 km of Manhattan to counties within a 150-mi radius of the assumed IND
detonation. It also predicted that even in some communities located far from Manhattan, arriving evacuees
would increase the population needing services by 50% to 150%.
Conclusions: The results suggest that suburban and rural communities could be overwhelmed by evacuees from
their center city following an IND detonation. They also highlight the urgency of educating and communicat-
ing with the public about radiation hazards to mitigate panic and hysteria, anticipating the ways in which a
mass exodus may disrupt or even cripple rescue and response efforts, and devising creative ways to exercise
and drill for an event about which there is great denial and fatalism.
(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S143-S150)
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Since the terrorism events of September 11, 2001,political leaders, academics, and government agen-cies consistently andwith increasing urgency have
warned Americans about the risks of nuclear terrorism
on US soil. During the last decade, Congress, the De-
partment of Homeland Security, and the Department
of Commerce have directed large appropriations to
screening of cargo and citizens at foreign and domestic
ports and at US border crossings to prevent fissile ma-
terial—the essential raw material of an improvised
nuclear device (IND)–from entering theUnited States.
The Department of Homeland Security also has in-
vested substantial sums promoting next-generation
nuclear detection technology and enhancing local gov-
ernment capacity to respond to catastrophic events. It
has devised and drilled 15 “national planning sce-
narios” that are included in the National Preparedness
Guidelines, including 1 planning scenario built around
the detonation of a 10-kiloton (kT) IND.
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
commonly known asNunn-Lugar, theUnited States has
directed billions of dollars to Russia and other coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union to identify, deacti-
vate, dispose of, and secure the Cold War’s nuclear ar-
senal and provide employment to nuclear scientists and
technicians previously employed in the Soviet mili-
tary and arms industries. Federal agencies and the state
and local counterparts that rely upon federal funding
have embraced a broad culture of all-hazards prepared-
ness. Even without considering the presumed substan-
tial intelligence and law enforcement assets that theUS
government uses to detect illicit commerce in nuclear
materials, the US government’s multilayered defenses
against domestic nuclear terrorism suggest that our gov-
ernment continues to view the threat as palpable and
serious.
It is only recently that a critical mass of analysts has be-
gun to address seriously what may happen if preven-
tion failed and a terrorist succeeded in detonating even
a low-yield (10 kT) IND in the downtown or port area
of a major American city. (For an introduction to this
topic, seeNationalCenter forDisaster Preparedness:Day
Three: Regional Resiliency and Health Challenges in
the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism, at http://www
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.gis09.com/FINALDay3Sum060110.pdf. This paper discusses
the development of a tool to model 1 limited aspect of such a
horrific scenario—the potentially chaotic evacuation of tens
or hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of people after the
detonation.)
The detonation of even a small IND in a major American city
would cause massive mortality and morbidity and a collapse of
infrastructure.Also, it iswidely believed that an INDattackwould
create a difficult-to-control spontaneousmass evacuation. Such
an exodus would have significant adverse effects on the com-
munities thatwould receive amassive population surge in a short
time.Amass evacuation intoor throughacommunitywould com-
promise existing resources and infrastructure, creating concern
about food supplies, water, gasoline, shelter and sanitation, health
systems, transportation, and law enforcement.Meeting the enor-
mous scale of arriving evacuees’ needs while simultaneously pre-
serving services to residents would be a logistical challenge re-
quiring coordination at multiple levels.
Amass evacuation also could congeal highways, secondary roads,
and local streets spreading outward from the regional center.
Such gridlock would compromise plans to mobilize first re-
sponders and transportation resources, move victims to treat-
ment facilities, deploy local law enforcement, establish mobile
hospitals, and distribute state and federal relief and response
supplies to where they are needed. Estimating the evacuation-
driven population surge after an IND detonation is critical to
effective advance planning to address these challenges.
METHODS
The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the
University of Chicago Evacuation Modeling Project
Modeling the evacuation of urban areas has focused in general
on ensuring the efficient transfer of the largest possible num-
ber of city residents beyond the danger zone. Despite mass ur-
ban evacuation events such as Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma, efforts to assesswhere evacuees actuallywent or are likely
to go and the impact evacuees had or potentially may have on
destination communities have been limited. The original pur-
pose of this project was to provide a resource for rural and sub-
urban emergency planners to conceptualize the potential ef-
fects of anurban evacuationon their communities. Itwas inspired
in part by evidence, subsequently reinforced by NORC key in-
formant interviews described in this section, thatmost rural and
suburban planners had not considered the effects of popula-
tion surge after urban disasters and that lack of understanding
of this phenomenon was a barrier to planning. NORC ex-
tended the project in 2010 to develop a model for predicting
the numbers of evacuees that suburban and rural communities
may receive after the detonation of an IND in midtown Man-
hattan (New York City).
The model developed through this project provides estimates
of numbers of evacuees and their distributions based upon a con-
ceptual “push-pull” model such as has been used in analyses of
human migration.1-3 In this model, the degree of the “push” is
dependent upon the nature of the precipitating event and the
“pull” reflects the relative attractiveness of surrounding com-
munities as potential evacuee destinations. In light of the lim-
ited public health infrastructures and sparse community re-
sources in many rural and even suburban areas, estimating
population surge after urban disasters is a critical first step to
effective emergency planning.
Variable Identification
We began by identifying variables believed to be predictive of
urban-to-rural evacuation. Our preferred sources were vari-
ables and data culled from the reporting on actual disaster events
such as hurricanes and the 1979ThreeMile Island (TMI)nuclear
reactor accident. Because such data are limited, we also used
studies of intended evacuation behavior, including a 2007 na-
tional survey of urban citizens’ evacuation intentions, con-
ducted by the authors.4 We supplemented the available litera-
ture with interviews with preparedness experts at the national
level and in rural and urban communities and vetted all of our
data with an expert advisory committee to select and weight a
set of predictive variables. Using the variables identified from
these sources, we developed amodel to predict populationmove-
ments within an urban region. Based upon this model, we de-
veloped an online geographic information system tool thatmod-
eled evacuation in the 3 scenarios for the 100 largest
metropolitan areas in the United States and for all of the state
capitals (www.cei.psu.edu/evac). In 2010, wemodified the tool
to model evacuation after the detonation of an IND in mid-
town Manhattan (www.cei.psu.edu/evac/nyc.html).
Historical data and research evidence came from several sources.
A number of studies were conducted in the years after the TMI
nuclear power plant incident. The hurricane-prone condi-
tions of the southeasternUnited States also have led to signifi-
cant research and publication on hurricanes and other natural
disasters that can result in evacuation.More recently, the threat
of terrorism after the attacks on September 11, 2001, has
prompted an emergence of research on issues related to hypo-
thetical acts of terror and the need for preparedness and evacu-
ation planning.
Johnson and Ziegler argue that perceived risk is greater in a ra-
diological emergency than other types of disasters5 and note that
evacuees flee farther from a radiological disaster than other
events.6 They noted that for the TMI incident, the observed
85-mimedian evacuation distance of central Pennsylvania resi-
dents was farther than evacuees traveled when fleeing from any
of themore than 500 natural and technological disasters in the
United States between 1960 and 1973, as cataloged by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency.7 Although the Mississauga,
Canada, train derailment in 1979 prompted the evacuation of
approximately 250 000 people, those evacuees generally re-
mainedwithin theToronto–Hamilton corridor, only a fewmiles
from the spreading chlorine gas cloud.6 Similarly, Ziegler and
Johnson note that during natural disasters such as floods, evacu-
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ees tend to travel no farther than the projected highwater line.6
At the time of their writing, the longest median evacuation dis-
tance on record in response to aGulf Coast hurricane had been
only 80 mi. Various studies cited by Ziegler and Johnson found
the median evacuation distances in response to TMI to be 85,
100, and 112 mi.6-9 More recently, Dow and Cutter observed
that in the context of hurricanes involving SouthCarolina, the
percentage of evacuees traveling out of state (and, by implica-
tion, the distance traveled during evacuations) has increased,
with 15% of evacuees traveling beyond the state border during
Hurricane Bertha in July 1996, 28% during Hurricane Fran in
September 1996, and 38% during Hurricane Floyd in Septem-
ber 1999.10 The 3 reasons given by evacuees for longer-
distance travel were friends and family offering shelter lived far-
ther away, the danger from the storm was great, and it was
necessary to travel that far to find available lodging.11
As part of this project, NORC at the University of Chicago
conducted a survey in 2007 of respondents’ intentions to evacu-
ate after the detonation of a dirty bomb or during an influenza
pandemic under varying conditions of external influence, as well
as likely evacuation distance and known destinations. Prior
evacuation surveys were used as a basis for survey content de-
velopment, combined with qualitative research conducted as
part of the NORC study; studies protocols were approved by
the NORC at the University of Chicago institutional review
board. Survey respondents were a nationally representative
sample of 1505 adults living in urban and suburban areas. Re-
spondents were reached by telephone in March 2007 and ad-
ministered a 15-item survey questionnaire as part of the EXCEL
National Telephone Omnibus Study, conducted by Interna-
tional Communications Research (Media, PA). (EXCEL uses
a fully replicated, stratified, single-stage random-digit-dialing
sample of telephone households. The EXCEL Omnibus Sur-
vey is conducted on a weekly basis, allowing survey questions
to be added on a rolling basis. Nonresponses [after 2 attempted
calls] are replaced with matched respondents based on stan-
dard demographic information until the desired sample size is
achieved, providing the relative advantage of quick survey turn-
around. Details on response rate are not provided because this
matched respondent process is used in lieu of continued follow-
up. Using this method, full survey completion was achieved in
a 2-week process.) InternationalCommunicationsResearch also
collected standard demographic and classification data for each
respondent household. Although 77% and 91% of respon-
dents intended to evacuate if the government suggested or or-
dered evacuation, for the pandemic influenza and dirty bomb
scenarios, respectively, 27%and 40% responded that theywould
still intend to evacuate even if it was against government ad-
vice. In both scenarios, 55% of respondents indicated that they
would be likely to travel to a rural destination and 52% of re-
spondents indicated that they would likely remain within a
150-mi radius.4
Certain characteristicsmay draw evacuees to particular commu-
nities.Analyses of actual evacuations, surveys of respondents’ in-
tended evacuation behavior, and projections of evacuations in
hypothetical disaster scenarios suggest that sheltering with fam-
ily or friends is the overwhelming first choice of evacuees, fol-
lowed byhotels andmotels, with public emergency shelters a des-
tination of last resort.Ananalysis of a hypothetical nuclear power
plant accident in which no evacuation order was given esti-
mated that 60% of evacuees would seek shelter with family or
friends,6 whereas following TMI, between 74% and 81% of the
actual evacuees traveled to the homes of family and friends.7 The
1984hypothetical studyalsoestimated that19%ofevacueeswould
seek shelter in hotels and motels, whereas only 6% would seek
safety in public shelters. A survey of evacuation destinations af-
terHurricane Bonnie showed that approximately 70%of evacu-
ees stayed with friends or family, 16% stayed in a hotel or motel,
and 5% stayed in a public shelter (9% responded “other”). As
with the hypothetical nuclear incident studies, a survey of in-
tentions concerning evacuation from a hypothetical hurricane
produced slightly lower percentages,with60%reporting that they
would staywith friends and family, 24% in a hotel ormotel, 12%
in a shelter, and 4% doing something else.12
As the final step in identifying push-pull factors, NORC con-
ducted interviews with 17 key informants representing aca-
demia, government, and the private sector. To incorporate rep-
resentation from varied geographic regions and city sizes, key
informants were selected from 6 paired rural and urban com-
munities (rural informants were located within 20 minutes to
4 hours of the urban informant locale) and 5 national prepared-
ness experts were chosen. The semistructured interviews fo-
cused on issues related to likely evacuee behavior in various sce-
narios and on critical features of surrounding communities that
would make them more or less attractive as destination sites.4
Based upon the reviewed literature and the concurrence of key
informants, we selected the following “push” and “pull” fac-
tors in developing our model algorithms:
• Push: People will evacuate farther from a radiological event
than from a natural hazard such as a hurricane, and as more
people evacuate, the distance traveled becomes greater. As
such, key push variables are the number of people evacuat-
ing and the distance traveled. As a result, the destination
county’s distance from the IND detonation becomes a key
factor in developing the algorithm.
• Pull: Pull variables influence the relative attractiveness of po-
tential destination communities and include items such as the
presence of friends and family, the number and availability of
hotel rooms, the capacity and quality of the roadnetworks pro-
viding access to the destination, the number of hospital beds
and pharmacies, and the extent of second/vacationhomeown-
ership. In developing the algorithm we limited pull variables
to those that were available in national data sets containing
information at the county level (Table 1).
Algorithm Development
To predict spontaneous urban evacuation and the subsequent
distribution of the evacuating population, we developed a con-
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ceptual push-pull mathematical model using weighted combi-
nations of key assumptions based upon information culled from
evacuation literature, the NORC survey, and expert opinion.
The push-pull model assumes that a pushing force is uniquely
generated by each scenario at the urban origin, and a pulling
force or attractiveness is generated by features of the potential
destination communities. Using the previously described analy-
sis, we set a percentage of the urban population expected to
evacuate upon a disaster. We subsequently distributed those
evacuees using each destination’s relative pulling force across
all counties located within a 150-mi radius of the affected ur-
ban center. Because the number of counties rises proportion-
ally as the radius of the potential evacuation zone increases, we
limited the radius to150mi to prevent findings from becoming
too diffuse. Using the 2007 NORC survey findings, we set the
proportion of evacuees remaining within the 150-mi radius at
52%4 (25% within 50 mi; 27% between 50 to 150 mi). The
model does not address the destinations of evacuees assumed
to travel beyond the 150-mi radius.
Themodel distributes evacuees that remain within the 150-mi
radius of the affected area across the destination counties based
upon the counties’ relative pull scores. A pull score is a stan-
dardized measure designed to reflect the potential destina-
tion’s relative attractiveness to evacuees. Computing each coun-
ty’s pull score was accomplished in 5 steps. First, we transformed
the data for each pull variable (eg, the number of hotel rooms
in a county) into standardized scores so that all of the vari-
ables, regardless of their unit of measurement, could be com-
pared. Second, using research findings and concurrence of an
expert panel comprising regional public health and emer-
gencymanagement personnel and academic modelers and pre-
paredness researchers, we weighted each variable to reflect its
relative contribution to the destination’s attractiveness to evacu-
ees. Third, we generated weighted standardized scores, provid-
ing a single total score for each county in each scenario. In the
fourth step we obtained ratios of weighted standardized scores
for all of the counties. These ratios measure, under similar con-
ditions and irrespective of distance from the source, the prob-
ability that an evacuee would choose a county as its final des-
tination. This, however, does not consider the distance from
the event and its effect on the final destination. The fifth and
final step was a computation of each county’s relative score by
considering its relative attractiveness and distance from the
event. The fifth step estimated the probabilities of evacuees from
the affected area traveling to different destinations at varying
distances. The distribution of evacuees is then estimated by cal-
culating expected total evacuees by probabilities of reaching
each of the different destinations within the 150-mi radius.
In February 2010, in conjunction with theNational Center for
Disaster Preparedness’ February 2010 Day Three: Regional Re-
siliency and Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear
Terrorism roundtable, we extended ourmodel to include evacu-
ation after the detonation of a 10-kT IND in midtown Man-
hattan. To accommodate this scenario, we modified the push
side of the model. We decreased the percentage of the popu-
lation evacuatingManhattan from65% to 40% to reflect amuch
greater level of injuries and fatalities from an IND detonation
compared with other urban disasters, while increasing the over-
all Manhattan population to include an estimated 1.48 mil-
lion commuters and 910 000 tourists. (NORCestimated the av-
erage daily commuter population based upon data from the 2000
US Census [http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo
/journey.html] and average daily tourist population based upon
data from the New York City Office of Tourism [http://www
.nycgo.com/?event=view.article&id=78912; estimate based on
annual number of tourists and 7-day average length of stay].)
In addition, we assumed that a large number of residents would
evacuate the counties immediately surrounding the borough of
Manhattan (ie, those within a 20-km radius) and Manhattan
itself. After adjusting these county populations for the com-
muterswhomwewere counting in the adjustedManhattanpopu-
lation, we assumed that 80% would evacuate from counties
within 10 km of Manhattan and 60% from counties between
10 and 20 km.
Based upon the long evacuation distances observed during the
TMI accident and upon expert opinion, we further modified
the IND scenario to reflect that evacueesmay travel farther and
set the proportion of evacuees remaining within the 150-mi ra-
dius at 40% (13% within 50 mi, 27% between 50 and 150 mi)
comparedwith 52% in the originalmodel. (Although themodel
does not incorporate the transportationmodalities used in evacu-
ating, the authors are inclined to believe that upon an INDdeto-
nation, most public transportation and air travel would be se-
verely disrupted or constrained, andmost evacuees would travel
bymeans of personal transportation.) The only additionalmodi-
fication made to the IND scenario was to reduce the relative
TABLE 1
Variables and Data Sources
Variable Source
Distance and road network information
Primary highways with limited access Smith Travel Research
Primary highways without limited access Smith Travel Research
Friends and family (nativity) 2000 US Census
Vacant housing units: for seasonal,
recreational, or occasional use
2000 US Census
Hotel/motel rooms Smith Travel Research
Recreational vehicle parks and recreational
camps
Smith Travel Research
Health and medical resources
Hospital beds Bureau of Labor Statistics
Pharmacies Bureau of Labor Statistics
Population information
Living in same House in 1995 and
2000 (5 y old)
2000 US Census
Household moved into unit 1990-1994 2000 US Census
Household moved into unit 1970-1979 2000 US Census
Household moved into unit 1969 or before 2000 US Census
Population density 2000 US Census
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pull of Long Island by 50%, to reflect the lower likelihood of
evacuees traveling to a destination with more limited accessi-
bility.
In the context of considering likely evacuation behavior, it is
worth noting that there has been much reporting recently on
an emerging consensus among federal agencies and major city
public health departments that sheltering in place would be the
most effective way to prevent harmful radiation exposure and
contamination, and on incipient governmental efforts to com-
municate this message.13,14 In fact, themost comprehensive fed-
eral government statement on this matter, the Planning Guid-
ance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation,15 states
unequivocally that “the best initial action immediately follow-
ing a nuclear explosion is to take shelter in the nearest andmost
protective building or structure and listen for instructions from
authorities,” and that “no evacuation should be attempted un-
til basic information is available regarding fallout distribution
and radiation dose rates.” Given the well-documented fear of
radiation among both first responders and the public at large,
and leaders’ reluctance to emphasize this issue, it likely will be
many years before studies may document a change in citizens’
evacuation behavior or intentions that is sufficient to justify
reconsidering the overall assumption of evacuation intent in-
herent to the model.
RESULTS
The IND version of themodel generates estimates of the popu-
lation surge from arriving evacuees for counties within a 150-mi
radius of Manhattan. Outputs demonstrate significant popula-
tion movement after urban disasters. Figure 1 shows the num-
ber of evacuees projected to be received in each destination
county within the 150-mi radius, and Figure 2 shows the pro-
jected percentage increase in the destination county’s popula-
tion. Although larger numbers of evacuees will travel to other
urban areas because of a greater likelihood of family relation-
ships and greater resource availability (Figure 1), smaller com-
munities tend to receive larger proportions of evacuees rela-
tive to their population (Figure 2). Table 2 presents outputs for
a sample of destination counties, highlighting total postevacu-
ation population and percentage population change for the IND
scenario.
COMMENT
The approach described in this article represents an initial at-
tempt to develop a predictive model to determine the number
of evacuees likely to seek shelter in rural and suburban coun-
ties after a disaster or public health emergency in a nearby ur-
ban center. Prior work has focused on how to move the maxi-
mum number of urban residents away from potential danger;
however, there has been little focus on determining the im-
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leaving 10 km 80
leaving 20 km 60
remain 50 mi 13
remain 150 mi 27
Long Island pull 50
Run Model
reset default values
# of evacuees 7 28 7563
Providence County
Rhode Island
pct evacuees: 2.154 %
num evacuees: 156 944
pop increase: 25.25 %
Urban to Rural Evacuation Tool Expected target counties for evacuees from New York City, NY from Scenario: 3 day out
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pact that such an evacuationmay have on the destination com-
munities.
A key finding, based upon our model, is that rural counties will
experience the greatest impact of population increase relative
to resident population. Although urban counties are likely to
receive greater numbers of evacuees, their ability to absorb and
care for these individuals is also greater. The greater “relative
impact” of evacuees on rural communities has significant im-
plications for sheltering, feeding, and providing medical care
to those evacuees. Given the limited public health, health care
delivery, water and sanitation, and administrative infrastruc-
tures of rural communities, these systems may be quickly over-
whelmed in the event of a mass urban evacuation.
Such a mass evacuation is likely to include a significant num-
ber of people with trauma and burn injuries and with radiation
exposure and contamination. The ability of the receiving com-
munities to treat these evacuees adequately is questionable. Re-
















Hartford CT 97 857 183 167 182 1 024 365 19.5
Windham CT 127 109 091 50 518 159 609 46.31
Cape May NJ 120 102 326 121 424 223 750 118.66
Middlesex NJ 32 750 162 116 098 866 260 15.48
Delaware NY 112 48 055 70 411 118 466 146.52
Nassau NY 20 1 334 544 108 305 1 442 849 8.12
Rockland NY 27 286 753 83 424 370 177 29.09
Philadelphia PA 80 1 517 550 296 195 1 813 745 19.52
Susquehanna PA 119 42 238 50 294 92 532 119.07
FIGURE 2
Percentage of change in destination county population
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Run Model
reset default values
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Schoharie County
New York
pct evacuees:  0.73 %
num evacuees: 53 213
pop increase: 168.49 %
Urban to Rural Evacuation Tool Expected target counties for evacuees from New York City, NY from Scenario: 3 day out
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consensus that in many US cities, the detonation of a 10- to
20-kT IND could destroy a large portion of the health care in-
frastructure, including many of the facilities capable of provid-
ing treatment for severe burn injuries and mass radiation ex-
posure16,17; that most hospitals view themselves as unprepared
to respond to a nuclear event18; and that similar deficiencies
exist with regard to first response and prehospital care, triage
and altered standards of care, medical countermeasures stock-
piles, health workforce absenteeism, and regional coordina-
tion for extreme events.19 There was a clear consensus among
participants in the Day 3 Roundtable that “no American city
or region, even with abundant state and federal government
and military support, has sufficient health care infrastructure
and resources to handle the anticipated injuries and illness from
the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear device.”20
Although our methodology is intended to provide informa-
tion on numbers of likely evacuees, we caution that the pur-
pose of presenting such estimates is to provide a resource for
rural and suburban emergency planners to conceptualize the po-
tential effects of an urban evacuation on their communities.
Our intent is to stimulate rural and suburban preparedness plan-
ning among community leaders that have not previously con-
sidered the issue of secondary impact on surrounding commu-
nities. The estimates of evacuee numbers can provide an initial
framework for the development of plans to respond to the po-
tential influx of evacuees.
Our methodology has several limitations. Both the selection
of predictive variables and the weighting of the variables were
limited by 5 factors. First, there is sparse historical evidence from
which to select variables known to predict evacuation behav-
ior. In the United States, the only major radiological emer-
gency occurred more than 25 years ago (TMI). More recent
evacuations for which data are available tend to be hurricane
or other natural disaster scenarios. We hesitate to generalize
certain aspects of natural disaster evacuation research to other
potential evacuation scenarios because there are confounding
factors in natural disasters, such as damage to property and prior
natural disaster experience for some individuals. In addition,
natural disasters frequently have a larger radius of impact or,
in the case of a hurricane, an expected path that may affect in-
dividuals’ choice of evacuation route and destination. As a re-
sult, we have attempted wherever possible to confirm the re-
liability of predictive variables across different types of disaster
scenarios. A second factor is the use of survey research to iden-
tify and weight variables. In general, disaster and evacuation
surveys use either a prospective or retrospective design, and a
known disconnect exists between respondents’ stated inten-
tions and their actual behavior. Although a handful of surveys
compare stated intentions with actual behavior in a subse-
quent disaster, the unpredictable nature of disasters make such
research difficult. A third limiting factor is the use of a limited
number of key informants and advisors to identify variableswhere
gaps exist in the literature. Attempting to mitigate this factor,
we included a wide sample of informants and advisors at vari-
ous levels and in various positions related to emergency pre-
paredness. The fourth limiting factor was the restriction of vari-
ables to those for which we could access national data sets with
information at the county level. Although more granular data
sources may exist for other plausible pull factors such as actual
hospital and intensive care unit bed vacancies, actual pharma-
ceutical and ventilator inventories, and actual hotel vacancy
rates, these were not available in forms that could be incorpo-
rated uniformly across jurisdictions. Finally, because we fo-
cused primarily on creating a framework to help planners con-
ceptualize localized effects of an evacuation from a nearby urban
center, we opted for assumptions that are strongly supported
by a comprehensive literature review and contemporary ex-
pert opinion, rather than for totally unassailable assumptions.
Wehope that futuremodeling refinementswill enable local plan-
ners to incorporate alternative assumptions to perform sensi-
tivity analyses and formulate their own conclusions about their
vulnerability.
CONCLUSIONS
TheNORCEvacuationModeling Project strongly supports the
conclusion voiced by experts at the National Center for Disas-
ter Preparedness Day Three roundtable—that a spontaneous
mass evacuation from an IND blast in an urban center could
lead to a dramatic population surge in surrounding communi-
ties. Such an exodus would extend panic and devastation far
beyond the locus of the event, draining food, water, medi-
cines, gasoline, and other resources from surrounding commu-
nities and potentially causing gridlock that would severely com-
promise many elements of the official disaster response. The
model’s projected population increases of up to 150% in sur-
rounding communities add urgency to the Day 3 recommen-
dations for enhanced public education and official communi-
cations to reduce spontaneous evacuation and for mass
evacuation drills and exercises. Such efforts would help tomiti-
gate concerns described above, and by increasing sheltering in
place and reducing citizens’ exposure to radiation, they also could
increase survivability. These and other equally sobering issues
highlight the urgent need for both a next generation of evacu-
ation simulations and federally mandated and funded regional
IND response planning and preparation.
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